“A constant theme in the desires of involved youth is for a more "democratic" state. However, they are not able to specify what this implies for Iran, other than generalized statements about greater "freedom" and openness. Democracy is an alien concept in Iranian history; it is a western invention that, without considerable change and adaptation, is not really relevant to the needs of Iran. However, the young people of the country see the affluence and freedom of their western peers and believe that the adoption of a similar political system will result in the same perquisites in Iran.”
A bit further in the report we read about growing Islamic sentiments among youth who prefer “traditional” way of living and “consider women just an object of beauty which, belongs to bed” that has been clarified earlier in the same report:
“There has been a noticeable and unexpected growth of .interest in religion among a small segment of the youth of Iran, especially those studying and teaching in the Universities. The Islamic students union is strong on all university campuses and attendance at the Tehran University Mosque is continually increasing. The increased interest in religion is basically conservative in nature and a reaction against Westernization, rather than a positive renaissance of religion on the campuses. A small number of students have also embraced religious orthodoxy as a means of criticizing the Shah and 1-1 4.s method of rule in Iran. Criticisms of the Shah which might be unacceptable in a secular context, can often be voiced under cover of an interest in strengthening the role of religion in Iranian life.
The vicissitudes of Western technology and the inroads made by Western culture have led many students to turn to religious conservatism and orthodoxy as a reaction against the trials of modernization and urbanization. Consequently, the growth of religious consciousness is not expected to lead to renewed interest in a Pan-Islamic movement among Iranian students or faculty. Not only does the usual Sunni-.Shi f ite split militate against the growth of Pan-Islamism in Iran, but the basically conservative, inward-looking, anti foreign basis for the revival of interest in religion in Iran among the young educated classes precludes the new interest from becoming a positive force for modernization or change in the country. It is necessary to re-emphasize that this growth of interest is on a small scale and affects • an extremely limited percentage of the student body. It is interesting, however, as an indication of one of the possible paths reaction against Westernization and modernization can take in the Iranian society.”
It is obvious by now that the “possible path” for the society which, was noticed by American intelligence among Iranian youth on a “small scale” became the actual path which, ruined not only the future of our nation, but also became a menace for the region to create a rush for western conventional armament so that during years of 1990 to 1994, a third of conventional arms produced in the world to be sold to three countries of Persian Gulf (Kuwait, UAE and Saudi) with a value of $67 billions. The report looks at the implications for foreign policy of United States:
“IMPLICATIONS FOR U. S. FOREIGN POLICY The attitudes of Iranian youth are important to our policy toward Iran because there is every indication that these attitudes will persist even as youth grows older. Even those who join the system and appear to be co-opted often have in fact, submerged rather than abandoned their earlier feelings. The attitudes which this report has discussed at length may be summarized for the present purpose as follows:
1. Acceptance of or resignation to the present situation, for the time being.
2. A strong yearning for . democratization, civil liberties, and a general opening and freeing of Iranian life.
3. A desire among a substantial portion of Iranian youth not to see the Pahlavi dynasty - with its present power .... continue after the present Shah, even though the concept of a Monarch who reigns but does not rule, has broader acceptance.
4. A powerful urge for greater national self-respect, independence, and realization of identify. If, as is our premise here, we must have a greater sensitivity to these feelings , whether open or covert, in Iran's future leaders , our assets in so doing are the admiration of young Iran for American ideals and democracy and for the openness, vitality, and dynamism of our society and our national life. Our hindrances are the very close identification of the United States with the Shah and with both the structure and the methods of his rule.
There is no noticeable feeling among young, urban Iranians that the United States encourages, or even approves in principle of, democratization in Iran. Instead there is a general feeling, that the United States prizes democracy for itself, but regards Iranians as a people unable to implement democracy, and in any case finds a totalitarian regime in Iran easier to work with or to manipulate. A number of possible events in Iran including the actual achievement of gradual democratization, could bring to positions of real power persons who had acquired these attitudes toward the United States in their youth. It is therefore imperative that we attack the bases of these attitudes wherever possible.”
As it can be seen from these few paragraphs, according to this report, Iranian society is not compatible with democracy for it is a “western invention” and has no relevance to the “needs of Iran” but in conclusion, it complains because Iranians can see through it! Through out history of relations between Iran and United States, especially during Kennedy era, US government has been putting a lot of stress on reform and even, in one occasion, insist on appointment of Dr. Amini as Prime Minister in order to carry out required reforms. But at the same time, US politicians did not agree with Shah’s argument about introduction of democracy in Iranian society in a slower pace and after educational and social reforms matured, while in this intelligence report they talk about “gradual democratization” which is unclear how. One may think that the authors of such intelligence reports are either extremely confused or trying hard to distort the truth about some issues.
In the same report, the “circles” of Iranian elite and how people got into this circle has been thoroughly studied and educated Iranians who were absorbed in this circle after their return from western nations in order to participate in the process of progress are labeled “opportunist” because they just integrated themselves in the system and thought of nothing but making money. In one report in 1972 Khomeini is compared with religious leaders of Constitutional revolution by stating that, the religious leaders of Constitutional revolution supported the reforms to limit the power of Shah in 1906 and Khomeini opposed the reforms that increased the power of Shah in 1960. The year 1960 of course seems to be incorrect as the actual confrontation between Khomeini and Iranian government over the suggested reforms by Shah happened in 1963.
From this statement, one may think that the reforms were about increasing the role and power of monarch through legal means and creation of new laws but in reality, all the articles of reform were related to social and welfare issues to help the move towards equal spread of wealth, health and education in the society and getting Iranian women more involved in the politics of the nation. It is interesting to know that internal opposition to Shah (mainly Tudeh party and Jebhe Melli) were trying to discredit these reforms as a show with no real effect which had been ordered by Washington because Kennedy administration was pressing the Shah for social reforms while US government, in their secret communications, considered them a tool to increase Shah’s power that Khomeini was opposed to! Portraying Khomeini like a true revolutionary champion for the cause of justice who attempts to fight the power of a dictatorial monarch is not limited to this document.
A couple of years earlier, American embassy in a report after death of Ayatollah Hakim in 1970, shows a lot of interest in the role of Iranian government in keeping Khomeini away from becoming the leader of Shi’ite world while, according to the embassy, he enjoys strong support among “Ulama” and “bazaaris”. It is unclear how American embassy has come up with that conclusion at that time while activities on behalf of Khomeini in bazaar was not evident until a few years later near late 1970’s. Even today, “Iran studies” book in the library of US congress (http://countrystudies.us/iran/) is propagating the same kind of information about Khomeini’s status among Iranians in early 1970’s:
“Khomeini, in exile in Iraq, continued to issue antigovernment statements, to attack the shah personally, and to organize supporters. In a series of lectures delivered to his students in An Najaf in 1969 and 1970 and later published in book form under the title of Velayat-e Faqih (The Vice Regency of the Islamic Jurist), he argued that monarchy was a form of government abhorrent to Islam, that true Muslims must strive for the establishment of an Islamic state, and that the leadership of the state belonged by right to the faqih, or Islamic jurist. A network of clerics worked for Khomeini in Iran, returning from periods of imprisonment and exile to continue their activities. Increasing internal difficulties in the early 1970s gradually won Khomeini a growing number of followers.”
Dr. Musa Al-Musavi-Esfahani, the son of grand Ayatollah Musavi-Esfahani and an Ayatollah himself, had spent a lot of time with Khomeini while in Najaf. In his interviews with Shahla Haeri in Harvard Oral History Project of Iran, Ayatollah Musavi-Esfahani says that Khomeini’s older son, Mustafa insisted on keeping his father away from politics through controlling all his meetings with those who came to visit him. Dr. Musavi-Esfahani has explained how Khomeini was later dragged back into political activities after Mustafa died. He claims that the people who were interested in this matter included Ahmad Khomeini and Mohammad Montazeri who was in contact with Libyan government. This issue raises another question about the death of Mustafa, which Mr. Musavi-Esfahani believes has been inspired by Ahmad Khomeini himself. Later in revolution days, it became clearer that both Mohammad Montazeri and Ahmad Khomeini had close relations with Sadiq Ghtobzadeh who was also in contact with Libyans and had received financial assistance from Libyans for his revolution!
This will remind us about the main and fundamental question on what mysterious force was at work to gradually pave the way for Khomeini to move to center stage even in presence of someone like Ayatollah Khoee who was the official “Pishva” of Shi’ite (as American Embassy refers to it)? From the murder of Ayatollah Shamsabadi and his family members to death of Mustafa Khomeini to disappearance of Musa Sadr in Libya and forcing Khomeini out of Iraq to go to Paris, there must have been a lot of “coincidences” involved in span of a few years to brew a “Islamic Revolution”.
To be continued..